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3. From political philosophy to messy 
empirical reality
Miklós Zala, Simon Rippon, Tom Theuns, 
Sem de Maagt and Bert van den Brink
3.1 INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO CONNECT 
NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
The mainstream of analytic political philosophy, which was our focus in 
Chapter 2, has primarily focused on ‘ideal theory’ that develops a conception 
of a more or less perfectly just society. This kind of theory has little need for 
empirical information. Philosophers have developed interesting and plausible 
ideal theories about how to distribute limited resources, or recognize each 
other as equals, or ensure that political power is fairly shared, in a just society.
But we don’t live in the just society, nor can we realistically hope to reach 
utopia from here. So, what does ideal theory tell us to do here and now? 
Suppose, for example, that in the just society we would all give a certain pro-
portion of our income to charity to help the least fortunate. In the real world, 
not everyone does their fair share of charitable giving. In consequence, some 
people starve, or die from curable diseases. One might reflect: If I were to give 
my fair share, people would continue to die because others would still fail to 
give theirs. So, am I obliged to give much more than my fair share, to mitigate 
these harms? More generally, people do not and will never comply with all 
their duties of justice. Knowing this, how should we arrange institutions in 
a just way? Given the manifold injustices in our society, how should we try to 
reduce the injustices and work towards a more just society? And what about 
the empirical complexities of the real world often overlooked by ideal theory: 
that it contains groups who have suffered a history of discrimination; or that it 
contains a wide variety of human beings with different abilities, attachments 
and responsibilities; or that it contains an intricate set of existing social and 
political institutions with specific roles and particular flaws, for example. 
What should be done here and now? Ideal theory is not designed to answer 
these questions, at least not directly.
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As we argue in this chapter, those interested in justice in Europe should take 
an interest in ‘non-ideal theory’: roughly speaking, a kind of down-to-earth 
theorizing about justice that takes into account relevant empirical information. 
Empirical information, of course, includes information about a society’s 
values, beliefs, preferences and experiences of justice and injustice. But justice 
is not simply what most people believe it is, or would prefer. Looking back 
on history, from Ancient Athens even until the 20th century, we now see 
that most people held seriously mistaken beliefs about justice: it was at times 
widely accepted as just that women should be denied the vote and excluded 
from the workplace, that slaves were bought and sold, or that the poor and 
so-called ‘idle’ would starve or were forced into the workhouse. Today’s 
widely accepted beliefs about justice may come to be seen as equally mistaken. 
So, we cannot find out what justice is – how the world ought to be – simply 
by surveying people’s beliefs, preferences or the like. This is an instance of 
‘Hume’s Law’ (see Chapter 2). Normative theory cannot be built wholly from 
empirical bricks. We need to take care to integrate empirical information into 
normative theorizing in the right way.
We proceed as follows. In Section 3.2 we examine the potential differences 
between ideal and non-ideal theory. We also defend the approach we recom-
mend for thinking about justice in Europe, for which we borrow Jonathan 
Wolff’s (2015b) term ‘real-world political philosophy’. In Section 3.3, we give 
an illustration of this approach to justice; showing how different diagnoses 
of the nature of disability (that is, attention to the nature of the problem) can 
inform different policy responses to injustices. Section 3.4 explores the ways 
public opinion and preference, and the opinions and experiences of vulnerable 
groups, matter for theorizing about justice. Section 3.5 discusses the crucial 
concepts of vulnerability and vulnerable groups. Section 3.6 briefly discusses 
the relevance of existing European legal frameworks and institutions for theo-
rizing justice in Europe.1  
3.2 IDEAL THEORY AND REAL-WORLD 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
The term non-ideal theory is used in contemporary political philosophy in 
several distinct though overlapping ways, almost always in opposition to ideal 
theory. Following Laura Valentini (2012), we identify three different under-
standings of the distinction: (1) the degree to which a theory assumes ‘full 
compliance’; (2) the degree to which a theory is ‘realistic’ or ‘utopian’; and (3) 
whether a theory is ‘transitional’ or ‘end-state’.
The first way of understanding the distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
theories is as a distinction between theories that assume that (virtually) all 
agents do everything justice demands (full compliance) and those that assume 
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only partial compliance (Valentini 2012). The obvious attraction of idealiza-
tion in this sense is that it makes analysis more tractable. Focusing on what 
justice would demand if everyone was willing to comply with the requirements 
of justice promises to show us justice in its ‘pure’ form (Ismael 2016). The 
risk is that it takes us too far from where we stand for the theory to provide 
useful guidance. For example, in a full compliance condition, we would only 
need to do our fair share to prevent injustices. But what should we do when 
compliance is only partial? For example, what are our duties with respect to 
global warming when others do nothing? Should we then do more than, less 
than, or just what would be our fair share in a full compliance condition? The 
answer seems to hinge on contingencies of the particular problem (Miller 
2011; Valentini 2012).
Second, we can understand the distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
theories as one between utopian and realist theories (Valentini 2012). The most 
prominent example of a utopian theory is that of G.A. Cohen (2008). Utopian 
theories treat justice as a timeless set of principles that are not hostage to 
empirical facts such as the complexities of human nature, real-world political 
disagreements and so forth. This means they do not so much tell us what we 
should do in the world we live in, as how to think about what kind of world 
would be ideal. 
Rawls describes his own theory as ideal insofar as it assumes full compli-
ance, and assumes that natural and historical circumstances are favourable, 
including the stipulation that society is developed enough economically and 
socially for justice to be achievable (Rawls 1999b; see also Chapter 2). But 
Rawls’s theory is designed in a realist way insofar as it assumes common 
sense facts about moderate scarcity, limited altruism, and the conflicts that 
arise between individuals with differing conceptions of the good life, that is, 
differing goals and values. At the heart of Rawls’s theory is the idea that justice 
is a matter of seeking fair terms of cooperation among ‘reasonable’ people: 
people who hold more or less coherent conceptions of the good life (usually 
relating to a religious, philosophical or moral tradition), are willing to accept 
and act on fair terms of cooperation on condition that others do likewise, 
and accept that because people reasonably disagree, no one should impose 
through state coercion the view of the good life that they happen to think is 
true. Rawls’s principles are thus designed for ‘beings like us, in circumstances 
similar enough to those in which we live’ (Valentini 2012, p. 658). 
Cohen (2008) critiqued Rawls’s theory for being too fact-dependent, and 
hence not utopian enough. Other critics have targeted Rawls from the opposite 
side: arguing that his theory of justice is not realist enough, because it fails 
to take seriously what they regard as relevant facts about real-world politics. 
For example, some critics claim that there is reasonable disagreement not just 
about conceptions of the good life, but about what justice is, and that this needs 
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to be taken seriously (Waldron 1999). Others have claimed that justice theo-
rizing should take into account existing power structures, accepted practices 
and beliefs, and facts about the shortcomings of human nature (Williams 2005; 
Geuss 2008; Galston 2010). This shows it is a matter of degree how utopian or 
fact-sensitive a theory is.
Finally, the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories can be under-
stood as the difference between end-state and transitional theories (Valentini 
2012). Rawls’s (1971 [1999a]) theory is an end-state theory in this sense, since 
it sets out to describe a ‘fair’ and ‘well-ordered’ society, in which not only 
is the basic structure just, but citizens accept the principles of justice and the 
justice of basic structure, and recognize that their fellow citizens accept it too. 
The problem with end-state theories is that they don’t directly tell us much 
about what we ought to do in the here-and-now, in societies which are far from 
the ideal. Other theorists have argued for transitional theories that lay more 
emphasis on how we can identify and correct glaring injustices here and now. 
Some theorists claim that for this purpose, we do not need to know what an 
ideal society would look like (Young 1990; Mills 2005; Wolff 2015a).
A good example of a transitional theory is the comparative method adopted 
by Amartya Sen (2006). Sen thinks that we can approach justice by a process of 
pairwise comparisons, on the one hand of the current state-of-affairs in a given 
circumstance, and on the other of the expected state-of-affairs after a reform or 
policy change, and that we need no conception of an ideal end-state to do this 
successfully. Simmons (2010) criticizes Sen’s view on the grounds that focus-
ing on nearby improvements in justice might lead us further away from the 
ideal state of affairs (by analogy, heading uphill in the middle of a mountain 
range might lead us away from the highest peak). Fraser (1995) would criticize 
such approaches for failing to distinguish between ‘affirmative’ remedies, 
which focus on remedying identified unjust end-states, leaving the social pro-
cesses that generate them untouched and potentially entrenching other kinds of 
injustice, and ‘transformative’ remedies that change social processes and solve 
the problems at their roots. But Fraser can in turn be accused of belittling the 
potential of incremental improvements in justice (see Chapter 12).
Sen’s approach is most powerful and convincing when it is used modestly, 
that is, when the real-world state-of-affairs in question is grossly or manifestly 
unjust in a way that the reform or policy change is expected to alleviate. 
Consider Sen’s idea of the example of gender violence: it just seems obvious, 
even in the absence of an ideal theory of justice, that decreasing the instances 
of gender violence would reduce the level of injustice in the world, other 
things being equal. An advantage of this modest version of Sen’s compara-
tive approach is that it mitigates the problems of irresolvable but reasonable 
disagreement and of value pluralism: the idea that there are multiple values 
that are incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be jointly realized 
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(Berlin 1969). Even if there is reasonable disagreement and, possibly, value 
pluralism about perfect justice, this does not mean we need to be committed to 
such reasonable disagreement about gross injustice. Perhaps reasonable views 
can and do converge when confronted with such injustices. It may not matter 
what grounds the injustice in question (presumably this would be the object 
of widespread disagreement) if one wants to articulate practical proposals for 
alleviating injustices. 
Consider, for example, the idea that it is unjust for a state to make no 
accommodations whatsoever to enable disabled persons to exercise their right 
to vote. That this is unjust may be grounded on a plurality of different reasons: 
it may be considered unjust qua a violation of disabled persons’ human rights, 
qua in conflict with procedural democratic justice, qua unfairly discriminating 
between disabled and able-bodied people and so on. Some of these reasons 
may be congruent or intertwined, while other reasons may be incommensura-
ble. Still, this view holds: regardless of the disagreement over why it is unjust, 
we can agree that it is unjust for states to make no accommodations whatso-
ever to enable disabled persons to vote. A state that reforms the organization 
of elections and electoral policy would then, in this precise sense, become 
less unjust. In other words, more generally stated, we don’t need to settle the 
precise nature of why certain injustices are unjust to be able to identify them 
as plausibly unjust.
This approach to prioritizing gross or manifest injustice, however, may seem 
to undermine interest in theorizing justice altogether. A critic may wonder 
why, if injustice is manifest, much is needed by way of empirical or indeed 
normative research. This position is wrongheaded. The fact that certain injus-
tices are manifest when they are in view need not entail their obviousness in the 
absence of analysis. Many manifest injustices may be hidden from sight, either 
because of a lack of attention to a particular issue or because there are reasons 
for them to be hidden, both in the passive and the active sense. Returning to 
the topic of gender injustice, Sen (1990) shows that there are 100 million fewer 
women alive than ought to be expected by biology, a difference that cannot 
be (fully) explained by selective abortions. This leads to the conclusion that 
millions of girls and women are dying earlier than they should, relative to boys 
and men, due to neglect. The idea that this situation is a manifest injustice does 
not discount the fact that it took painstaking and difficult work to recognize 
its existence.
This last point can be generalized: it will often take painstaking empirical 
work to determine ‘the facts’, some of which, when in view, will appear 
manifestly unjust. Furthermore, it will be useful to understand the root causes 
of the manifest injustices we identify, so that we can address the fundamental 
problems rather than merely mitigate the symptoms. But even this does not 
conclude our normative inquiry. This is because solving a problem is not 
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always as simple as removing or reversing its cause. One does not help a stab-
bing victim by simply removing the knife; that may make things even worse.
If we wish to understand justice in Europe, we think it necessary to adopt 
a bottom-up approach to justice that begins from the practical problems and the 
manifest injustices that we face. This requires collaboration between empirical 
research and normative thinking, because bottom-up theorizing requires plenty 
of empirical information to be able to get off the ground (Wolff 2011, chapter 
9, 2015b). We adopt Wolff’s phrase ‘real-world political philosophy’ to 
describe our favoured approach. Real-world political philosophy is non-ideal 
theory in all three of the senses defined by Valentini (2012). It makes no ideal-
istic assumption of full compliance, it begins from the empirical complexity of 
real-world problems, and it seeks improvement from where we are now, rather 
than a utopian ideal.
It is important to note that real-world political philosophy must be partial, 
as it does not aim to provide a complete account of a just society. Instead it 
might selectively focus on particular real-world issues such as drug regulation, 
gambling or public safety (Wolff 2011), or analyse specific forms of injustice 
and the social mechanisms that bring them about (Young 2011), or focus on 
particular vulnerable groups, as the ETHOS project generally has (see in par-
ticular Chapters 8 to 11). That said, in proposing a bottom-up, partial approach 
to justice, we do not thereby advocate ‘isolationism’ in Simon Caney’s sense 
(2012, pp. 258–9). By ‘isolationist’, Caney means a treatment of the justice of 
one issue (for example, of climate change or gender) as if it were independ-
ent of all other issues of justice, and of general principles of justice. In the 
approach we advocate, as Wolff writes, ‘the first task is to try to understand 
enough about the policy area to be able to comprehend why it generates moral 
difficulties, and then to connect those difficulties or dilemmas with patterns of 
philosophical reasoning and reflection’ (Wolff 2011, p. 9). This approach need 
not be isolationist, since one can go on to connect bottom-up philosophical 
reflection on one real-world problem with broader normative considerations, 
including those of a more comprehensive or ideal political theory. In the end, 
while we believe that this integrative philosophical work is valuable, it does 
not follow that everything must be provided by the bottom-up, partial theory 
itself. Moreover, by a ‘partial’ or ‘selective’ bottom-up approach we do not 
mean that problems of injustice should be treated as though they are caus-
ally independent of one another, or that we should ignore intersectionality. 
Injustices, such as those related to climate change, migration and inequality are 
frequently related, and a sound bottom-up approach to justice would seek some 
understanding of their relations.
Because of its attention to specific, identifiable injustices, not only is 
real-world political philosophy partial (in the sense that it cannot hope to 
provide a complete normative theory of injustice, analogous to an ideal account 
Miklós Zala, Simon Rippon, Tom Theuns, Sem de Maagt and Bert van den Brink - 9781839108488
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 04/30/2021 07:03:01PM
via free access
From political philosophy to messy empirical reality 43
of the just society), but it is also rather difficult to characterize in general terms. 
Perhaps there is no better way to characterize this kind of theorizing than by 
example. Therefore, though considerations of length mean we cannot resolve 
or do justice to the complexity of the issues, we now turn to an example of 
how real-world political philosophy might approach one kind of problem of 
justice. We will show how concerns of recognition and redistribution arise in 
connection with a group of potentially vulnerable persons: people living with 
disabilities. Then we will indicate how different empirical models of the ways 
in which disabled people come to be disadvantaged suggest different kinds of 
policy remedies.
3.3 AN ILLUSTRATION: DISABILITY
People living with disabilities are frequently victims of exclusion and stigmati-
zation, and are often disadvantaged in terms of income, wealth and opportuni-
ties (Putnam et al. 2019). This twofold concern evokes Nancy Fraser’s (1995) 
two-dimensional framework of justice in terms of claims to recognition and 
redistribution (compare Fraser’s later three-dimensional framework, discussed 
in Chapters 1, 4 and 12 of this volume). Indeed, as Gideon Calder points out, 
‘in particular, internally diverse ways, people with disabilities have been on 
the end of a kind of pincer movement between Fraser’s two impediments to 
parity; maldistribution and misrecognition’ (2010, p. 62, quoted in Putnam et 
al. 2019). 
Justice for the disabled can be conceived of as a requirement that people 
with physical or mental impairments should not suffer disadvantages due to 
their atypical physical or mental characteristics. This needs an approach that 
we described above: one that first aims to diagnose injustice by understanding 
the ways in which people with physical or mental impairments come to be 
disadvantaged, and only then suggests a remedy. To diagnose injustice in this 
context, we start by examining the different explanatory models of disability.
Mainstream models of disability are of four different types: (1) the medical 
model; (2) the radical social model; (3) the minority group model; and (4) the 
human variation model. These models provide different explanations of the 
nature of disability and of why it is a problem (Wasserman et al. 2016):
1. The medical model of disability sees disability as an individual patholog-
ical condition that results in certain kinds of personal and social limita-
tions. On this view, the limitations and disadvantages that physically or 
mentally impaired persons face stem from their individual impairments.
2. The radical social model of disability has been embraced by social move-
ments since the 1960s in opposition to the medical model. According to 
the social model, disabilities are the results of discrimination and exclu-
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sion from mainstream society. The activists of the Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), the leading advocates of the 
social model in the UK, denied any causal role to physical impairments in 
creating disabilities: ‘In our view, it is society which disables physically 
impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impair-
ments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
participation in society’ (UPIAS 1976, p. 3, quoted in Shakespeare 2006, 
p. 29).
3. The minority group model of disability, popular among contemporary 
disability scholars, is a version of the social model that emphasizes the 
similarity between disabled people and groups such as racial or ethnic 
minorities, who are subject to discrimination. On this model, the harm of 
disability arises primarily from exclusion. It advocates placing physical or 
mental impairments among the suspect categories in discrimination law 
(see Hahn 1996).
4. Another contemporary version of the social model, the human variation 
model, emphasizes the interaction between individual characteristics 
(impairments) and the social/material environment (for example, public 
buildings). It sees disadvantage as stemming from a mismatch between 
the two, which arises because the social/material environment cannot suit 
every individual human variation (Putnam et al. 2019).
The four different models of disability may suggest different remedies 
(Putnam et al. 2019). Wolff (2002) suggests four kinds of possible remedy. 
We first outline these, then briefly assess their congruence with the different 
models of disability outlined above: 
(a) Personal enhancement: acting directly on the body or mind (for example, 
medical treatment).
(b) Targeted resource enhancement: the provision of (money for) resources 
for specific purposes (for example, a wheelchair to improve mobility, or 
eyeglasses to improve vision, or assistance services).
(c) Status enhancement: changing the way the public see the disabled, and 
enhancing the social/material environment to improve their functional 
ability (for example, adding ramps to public buildings for wheelchair 
users).
(d) Cash compensation: offering money, not for targeted resource enhance-
ment, but to counterbalance supposed suffering such that the person no 
longer minds or regrets their disability.
As Wolff points out, cash compensation is a problematic remedy: ‘I do not 
know of an argument from within the disability movement that the special 
miseries of the disabled need cash compensation, and no doubt this would be 
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considered deeply insulting’ (Wolff 2002, p. 211). Therefore, we can focus 
only on the first three, comparing these remedies with the four models of 
disability previously outlined. 
The medical model sees the problem in personal physical or mental impair-
ment and suggests the cure of personal enhancement. The medical model can 
also recommend targeted resource enhancement and status enhancement, but 
only as second-best solutions. The radical social model sees the problem in dis-
abling environments and suggests their reconstruction. This model disfavours 
personal enhancement as a solution and suggests status enhancement. The 
minority group model holds that the problem is the exclusion and discrimina-
tion of mainstream society, which suggests as a remedy status enhancement for 
the disabled. The human variation model locates the problem in the mismatch 
between human variations and environment, and suggests the remedies of 
either targeted resource allocation or status enhancement, with an emphasis 
on reconstructing the environment to accommodate the atypical personal 
characteristics.
In this way, different understandings of the problem of disability, and the 
mechanisms by which injustice is brought about, can help us shape the kind 
of policy recommendation to be offered as a remedy. Our method of theo-
rizing justice in the context of disability will be real-world political philos-
ophy insofar as we begin from an empirically informed understanding of the 
problem, use this to reason about the kind of moral difficulties it raises, and 
then reason towards principles of justice and policy recommendations that may 
ameliorate it. We are not engaged in top-down application of a preconceived 
theory of justice, but in bottom-up reasoning from the specific challenges that 
confront members of society. (For more on issues of disability and justice, see 
Chapter 10; also Anderson 2018.)
3.4 THE RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
AND THE OPINIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF 
MARGINALIZED GROUPS TO THEORIZING 
ABOUT JUSTICE
As mentioned in the introduction, empirical information about a society 
includes information about people’s values, beliefs, preferences and expe-
riences of justice and injustice. But justice is not plausibly understood as 
whatever (most) people believe it is. The question of how real-world political 
philosophy should be sensitive to psychological states is thus a delicate one.
There are several reasons for taking into account public opinion about justice 
when we are theorizing about it, as described by Adam Swift (1999). First, 
public opinion can play a useful cautionary role for the theorist. Knowing that 
others think differently about justice may give one cause for doubt, and reason 
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to reconsider one’s theory. Philosophical reasoning can lead us to principles 
of justice that radically diverge from received opinion, and that many would 
find counterintuitive. While this is not in itself an objection to the principles, it 
should lead us to take particular care to check our arguments.
Second, at least in democracies, public opinion can set limits on what is 
politically feasible. Insofar as we are theorizing about justice and offering 
arguments to try to change the world, and not purely for academic interest, we 
had better take public opinion into consideration. At the same time, however, 
we should be wary of taking public opinion as a given and as a hard feasibility 
constraint on justice. Public opinion can change, and the views propounded 
by theorists can play a role in changing it. If we hew too closely to the limits 
of what we view as feasible in the short term, we may miss out on long-term 
progress.
A slightly different but closely related role of public opinion has to do 
with the stability of political and economic institutions. Rawls’s project in 
Political Liberalism (1993), for instance, was to investigate how a just and 
stable democratic society is possible. His concern with the stability of the 
basic structure of society was an important reason for giving a justificatory 
role to public opinion. Rawls’s basic idea was that there exists a reasonable 
pluralism of conflicting religious, moral and philosophical traditions, so the 
principles of justice for a society should be justified not by reference to any 
particular tradition, but rather by reference to shared principles and values that 
are implicit in democratic practices and institutions as such. Rawls sought an 
‘overlapping consensus’ in which citizens affirm the same basic conception 
of justice, though for different reasons, stemming from their differing concep-
tions of the good and their desire to pursue these. Rawls contrasts this idea of 
an overlapping consensus with that of a mere modus vivendi in which there 
would only be a balance of power between competing groups. In case of an 
overlapping consensus a society is stable for the right kind of reason, because 
all reasonable citizens can wholeheartedly affirm the shared conception of 
justice (for different reasons), whereas in a modus vivendi a society may be 
momentarily stable, but not robustly so. 
Third, one might think that public opinion plays a constitutive role in deter-
mining the true principles of justice. The boldest version of this view is the one 
encountered in the introduction: that justice is just what people believe it is. 
This view is implausible because public opinion can be abhorrent or incoher-
ent. Weaker versions of it have been defended by interpretivist theorists such 
as Michael Walzer (1983) and David Miller (1999, 2016). Walzer’s egalitarian 
theory of distributive justice starts from an analysis of the social meanings that 
arise from our conception and creation of different kinds of goods. Walzer 
considers himself guided by a ‘decent respect for the opinions of mankind’ 
(1983, p. 320). At any rate, Walzer is certainly guided by his interpretation 
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of the meaning of actual institutions and practices, and the ways that they 
treat different criteria and arrangements as appropriate for the distribution of 
different kinds of goods. For example, our institutions suggest that money and 
political office should not be distributed according to the same logic: political 
office is not to be bought and sold. Similarly, Miller claims that a theory of 
justice is to be developed by ‘bringing out the deep structure of [the public’s] 
set of everyday beliefs’ (1999, p. 51), so that philosophical theorizing about 
justice should be constrained by the public’s commitments. A main challenge 
that has dogged theorists like Miller is to explain why theorists are entitled to 
use a critical standpoint to, as it were, correct the deficiencies of existing public 
opinion and of the practices of their fellow citizens, while yet maintaining that 
normative theorizing should be fundamentally constrained in any way by what 
people happen in fact to think or to treat as appropriate (Baderin 2018).
A modified version of the constitutivist view is not similarly theoretically 
problematic. On this view, public opinion does not determine the true princi-
ples of justice at a fundamental level, but rather the true principles of justice, 
which have independent grounding, give weight to public opinion on certain 
issues. For example, it might be that society’s conventional desert claims are 
mistaken, but when people have acted in good faith on these, they still seem 
relevant to what these people should get as a matter of justice (Swift 1999).
There are many more contexts in which the true principles of justice 
plausibly give weight to the public’s experiences and preferences, not just 
their opinions about justice. For example, suppose that a town can apply for 
a limited grant to build either a handball arena or a football stadium, and that 
a large majority would prefer the handball arena. All other things being equal, 
it is plausible that justice requires following the majority preference and 
building the arena. More generally, justice must take into account what people 
experience as beneficial or detrimental to their well-being.
In addition to considering the opinions, preferences and experiences of the 
public as a whole in theorizing about justice, we have particular reason to take 
into consideration the experiences and opinions about justice of marginal-
ized and vulnerable groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and refugees. 
Members of marginalized and vulnerable groups often have unique insight 
into the circumstances of injustice they experience (Young 1990). Their rele-
vant social knowledge may be largely tacit, which means it is not a matter of 
knowing propositions that can be straightforwardly expressed and transmitted 
by testimony. Indeed, their knowledge of injustices they face may be tacit 
because of hermeneutic injustice they have suffered, where the dominant 
social group denies them the conceptual resources needed to fully interpret and 
express their experiences of injustice (Fricker 2007; Lepianka 2019; Rippon 
and Zala 2019). Consequently, members of marginalized and vulnerable 
groups have special claims to be heard and to be included as participants in 
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theorizing about justice; both epistemic, in virtue of their superior epistemic 
standpoints, and moral, in virtue of their claims to recognition as victims of 
injustice (Wasserman et al. 2016). For a presentation of some of the ETHOS 
project research that attempts to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable 
groups, see Chapters 8 to 11 of this volume.
3.5 VULNERABILITY
As we have seen, it is important to listen to the opinions of the members of 
marginalized and vulnerable groups. Members of vulnerable groups are more 
likely to suffer injustice, giving them a claim to recognition, and they are in 
a privileged epistemic position to identify the injustices they may face and the 
mechanisms that reinforce these. But what is vulnerability, anyway? We can 
understand vulnerability in either an absolute or a relative way.
Absolute vulnerability is thought of as an inherent, ontological property of 
human life. On this view, our human nature as embodied creatures who are 
mortal, needy and dependent on others makes us essentially fragile and suscep-
tible to suffering, wounding and injury (Mackenzie et al. 2014). This absolute 
view of vulnerability is closely connected to the focus on interrelatedness and 
dependency of human beings found in the ‘ethics of care’ tradition.
In contrast, relative vulnerability is the ‘susceptibility of particular persons 
or groups to specific kinds of harm or threat by others … vulnerable persons 
are those with reduced capacity, power, or control to protect their interests 
relative to other agents’ (Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 6). While some vulner-
ability may be intrinsic to the human condition, relative vulnerability often 
has a context-dependent, situational character. Situational vulnerability is 
socially constructed, that is, it ‘may be caused or exacerbated by the personal, 
social, political, economic, or environmental situations of individuals or 
social groups’ (Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 7). To take an example, in a natural 
disaster, situational vulnerabilities may arise from the way in which social 
factors mediate and amplify its effects in certain populations (Mackenzie et 
al. 2014; see also Young 2011, chapter 2). A subset of situational vulnerabil-
ities can be identified as pathogenic. This subset includes ‘morally dysfunc-
tional or abusive interpersonal and social relationships and socio-political 
oppression or injustice’ as well as special cases when the attempt to alleviate 
someone’s vulnerability leads to ‘the paradoxical effect of exacerbating 
existing vulnerabilities or generating new ones’ (Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 9). 
Another morally important point is that while broad groups are subject to 
vulnerabilities, whether these vulnerabilities are manifest (that is, whether 
harms occur because of them) depends on a range of different factors, such 
as socio-economic status and education, access to health care and so on. For 
example, all pregnant women are vulnerable to complications in childbirth, but 
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these complications do not occur with equal frequency or harmfulness to all 
women. Within vulnerable groups, some are more vulnerable than others, and 
vulnerability is frequently exacerbated by intersectionality (Anderson et al. 
2018; see also Chapter 13 of this volume).
Implicit in the relative notion of vulnerability, then, is the role of social 
causation in creating vulnerabilities. This is especially important in the context 
of theorizing about justice because unjust social structures often create vulner-
abilities. For example, in Section 3.3 we encountered the radical social model 
of disability: that it is society that turns impairments into disabilities. A related 
claim is that society unnecessarily institutionalizes the disabled, although they 
could be just as creative as others if adequate social accommodations were 
provided (Shakespeare 2006; see also Chapter 10). Similarly, Judith Butler 
makes the distinction between ‘precariousness’, that is, a ‘general feature of 
embodied life’, and ‘precarity’, that is, a politically situated concept where 
‘precariousness is amplified or made more acute under certain social policies’. 
Thus, according to Butler, ‘precarity is induced. And precaritization helps 
us think about the processes through which precarity is induced – those can 
be police action, economic policies, governmental policies, or forms of state 
racism and militarization’ (Butler, interviewed in Kania 2013, p. 33).
It is evident that vulnerability bears a complex relationship to the human 
being, to the social world, and to justice, for which it very much matters 
whether a vulnerability is absolute or relative, whether it is situational, 
and whether it is exacerbated or made manifest by unjust social structures. 
Real-world political philosophy for a project like understanding justice in 
Europe needs a division of labour. It is necessary to identify what situations or 
processes worsen (or can alleviate) what kind of vulnerability of what groups. 
These groups are numerous, and it is also clear that vulnerabilities can also 
intersect (Crenshaw 1991; Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). It is probably impossi-
ble to give a comprehensive list of vulnerable groups that exist in Europe and 
their vulnerabilities. But the ideas of vulnerability and of vulnerable groups 
can work together with the concept of manifest injustices we encountered in 
Section 3.2, helping us to identify and better understand the manifest injustices 
that exist across a pretty heterogeneous region. Vulnerable groups are likely 
to include ethnic and cultural minorities (Chapter 8), children (Chapter 9), the 
elderly, caregivers and people living with disabilities (Chapter 10), and women 
(Chapter 11), who may be subject to marginalization and misrecognition. 
However, it must be remembered that vulnerable groups are not internally 
homogeneous. Some are more vulnerable than others, and intersectionality 
plays a significant role. Specific problems of relative vulnerability can be 
raised within vulnerable groups due to hierarchies of social and political 
influence, relative socio-economic position, gender and so on (see also Bugra 
2018). But even the identification of particularly vulnerable persons and the 
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nature of their vulnerabilities is not the end of our normative inquiry, because 
the mere identification of vulnerabilities, like the identification of manifest 
injustices, does not yet tell us what should be done about them, or who should 
be responsible for doing it, for example, the nation states or the European 
Union as a supranational entity. 
3.6 THE RELEVANCE OF EUROPEAN LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Real-world political philosophy begins from the real world we live in, rather 
than an ideal world we might like to live in. The current European legal frame-
works and traditions, both within European states and at the supranational 
level (in the EU and in the Council of Europe, for example) is of importance 
for at least two reasons. First, it is important to understand how vulnerabilities 
and injustices arise from the way that legal and social institutions impact on 
particular groups and individuals. Second, if we want to make pragmatic 
proposals about what to do here and now, we must propose amendments to 
current law and policy, however imperfect it may be, rather than propose some 
imaginary policy we would like to have instead. We must be able to get there 
from here.
The EU as a unique supranational entity raises the scope of justice question, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. For anti-cosmopolitans, principles of justice will 
apply at the level of the EU as they apply to nation states only insofar as fellow 
citizens of the EU are analogous to compatriots, with whom we are engaged 
in a shared political project and with whom we have communal ties. For 
institutionalists, inspired by the Rawlsian idea that justice concerns arise only 
in situations in which individuals cooperate for mutual benefit, principles of 
justice will apply only insofar as the institutions at the supranational level are 
robust enough to trigger obligations. One influential institutionalist, Andrea 
Sangiovanni, argues that the EU is ‘an attempt to support the interests of each 
of its member states in enhancing both growth and internal problem-solving 
capacity (including the capacity to act on domestic commitments to national 
solidarity) against a background of regional stability’ (Sangiovanni 2013, 
p. 228). Since some member states may benefit more than others from this 
project, this raises the question what principles should apply for the redistribu-
tion of benefits and burdens.
One important question to consider both from the pragmatic perspective of 
real-world political philosophy and from the perspective of the scope question 
is the legal question of which areas of policy are competencies of supranational 
institutions, and which competencies are reserved to states. Supranational 
institutions cannot, at least currently, be expected to uphold justice in Europe 
in areas in which they have no legal competence to intervene.
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For these reasons, we need to pay close attention to the nature of existing 
legal frameworks and institutions. (The nature of various existing European 
legal frameworks and traditions, and their impact on justice, is explored in 
detail in Chapters 5 to 7 of this volume.) We should not forget, though, that 
justice is normative: it is not about what is the case, but about what ought to 
be. We should therefore not limit ourselves to internal criticisms of European 
institutions, taking their current ambitions for granted. The fact that institu-
tions currently do not take responsibility in particular areas does not imply that 
they should not (be enabled to) take responsibility. As well as the specificities 
of the European legal frameworks and traditions, we should not forget to pay 
heed to considerations of moral responsibility, capacity and efficiency when 
considering who should remedy injustices in Europe. 
NOTE
1. This chapter draws on material previously published in ETHOS reports by Rippon 
et al. (2018), van den Brink et al. (2018) and de Maagt et al. (2019).
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